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 The expansion of off-the-shelf or civilianized UAS platforms presents 
unique opportunities for criminal or terrorist exploitation of UAS systems. 
According to the U.S. Department of State (2006), terrorists are adept at 
weaponizing technology not originally designed for destructive purposes. 
Terrorists utilize current technology in both conventional and unconventional 
means to inflict terror and achieve mass effects (U.S. Department of State, 2006). 
 
Such fears are not merely hypothetical. In December 2013, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel attended an outdoor campaign rally in Dresden (Naim, 
2013). While on the podium, a small quadcopter crash-landed on the platform next 
to Merkel and her colleagues (Naim, 2013). Fortunately for Merkel, the UAS stunt 
was operated by members of the rival Pirate Party and merely flown to make a 
political statement against the nation’s use of unmanned craft for security (Naim, 
2013). Not surprisingly, experts were quick to point out the potential security 
implications of the incident, citing the potential for drones to be outfitted with 
weapons or explosives. This incident was a wakeup call for global security 
agencies—civilian use of unmanned vehicles presents new potential threats to 
public security. 
 
This incident came as no surprise to U.S. law enforcement agencies, as only 
two years prior, a terrorist plot involving UAS craft was thwarted by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. In 2011, 26-year old Rezwan Ferdaus was arrested for 
plotting an attack on the Pentagon and Capital buildings using a remotely controlled 
aircraft containing C-4 explosives (“Feds,” 2011; “Model,” 2011). Ferdaus planned 
to fly three miniature, jet-powered models packed with a combined 15 pounds of 
C-4 and direct the explosive-laden craft at the target buildings (“Model,” 2011). A 
similar plot was foiled in 2015 when El Mehdi Semlali Fahti was caught for plotting 
to attack a school and federal building using remote-controlled aircraft equipped 
with improvised explosive devices (Brandon, 2014). Fahti detailed how he would 
obtain the explosive materials and indicated the plot would be funded through drug 
profits and money laundering (Brandon, 2014).   
 
Despite its successes in thwarting previous UAS plots, law enforcement 
efforts continue to show vulnerabilities to potential UAS threats. In January 2015, 
an allegedly drunken Geospatial Intelligence Agency employee lost control of his 
friend’s small quadcopter UAS in the heart of Washington D.C. (Shear & Schmidt, 
2015). Unbeknownst to him, the small craft had overflown the White House 
perimeter fence and crashed on the presidential residence lawn (Shear & Schmidt, 
2015). The drone was reportedly sighted by an on-duty law enforcement officer, 
but went undetected by the White House’s aerial defense radar (Shear & Schmidt, 
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2015). While this incident was unintentional, it further exemplifies the 
vulnerabilities against a potential UAS threat.  
 
Drones continue to circumvent traditional security efforts. In yet another 
incident, a small drone was found on the roof of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe’s office in Tokyo (“Drone,” 2015). Initially, Japanese investigators reported 
not knowing who was responsible for the incident (“Drone,” 2015). Most alarming, 
however, was the discovery that the UAS craft was marked with radioactive 
symbols, carried a plastic bottle with unidentifiable contents, and registered trace 
levels of radiation (“Drone,” 2015).  
 
Problem 
 
Law enforcement and security agencies have demonstrated they are ill-
prepared to combat ever-growing UAS threats. Because of the novelty of UAS 
systems, potential UAS threats are poorly understood by law enforcement and 
security personnel. Moreover, there is currently no cohesive defense strategy in 
which to systematically counter UAS threats.  
 
Purpose 
 
This study sought to identify potential uses and adaptations of UAS systems 
as weapons of terrorism or crime by establishing a cumulative list of generic, 
intentional and unlawful uses of UAS systems. The study also sought to propose a 
recommended model of defenses, countermeasures, and mitigation strategies 
against illicit UAS employment or attacks.   
 
Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this research study, the following definitions were used: 
 
Political scientist David Rapoport (2008) codifies terrorism as 
Terror is violence with distinctive properties used for political purposes 
both by private parties and states. That violence is unregulated by publicly 
accepted norms to contain violence, the rules of war, and the rules of 
punishment. Private groups using terror most often disregard the rules of 
war, while state terror generally disregards legally codified rules of 
punishment, i.e. those enabling us to distinguish guilt from innocence, but 
both states and non-state groups can ignore either set of rules. (footnote 12).  
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According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.), crime is defined as 
(1) An act or the commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of 
a duty that is commanded by a public law that makes the offender liable to 
punishment by that law. (p. 1)   
 
Method 
 
This study utilized qualitative, Conceptual Analysis methodology. 
According to Petocz and Newberry (2010) Conceptual Analysis is “the analysis of 
concepts, terms, variables, constructs, definitions, assertions, hypotheses, and 
theories. It involves examining these for clarity and coherence, critically 
scrutinizing their logical relations, and identifying assumptions and implications” 
(p. 126).  
 
Academic research articles, unclassified government reports, and open-
source news articles were assessed to identify recurring themes related to the 
targeting, employment, adaptations, and defenses against UAS threats. Thematic 
trends were categorized and coded to model illicit UAS employment methods and 
evaluate systematic defense mechanisms.   
 
The study sought to discover answers to the following research questions: 
1. How are UAS systems used for illegal purposes or terrorism? 
2. What are current defense methods against UAS threats? 
 
Articles were selected using an internet search engine with Boolean search 
pattern for five preselected search combinations, which included nine unique 
permutations of terms: UAS/UAV/drone and Terrorism, Threat, and Malicious 
Use. Articles were assessed for thematic concepts. Researchers established a 
thematic concepts list for each of the topical areas: illegal/terroristic UAS 
methodology and UAS defense measures or systems. Articles, which presented 
unique or original concepts, were added to the respective thematic concept list. 
Repeating or recurring concepts were annotated according to each concept theme. 
Some articles contained only a single concept while others contained multiple 
concepts. Whenever possible, concepts were generalized to fit within the coding 
system, so long as the generalization did not compromise unique concept findings. 
Collection of data continued until it was clear that researchers could not derive 
additional unique concepts from further data analysis—in other words, concept 
saturation was reached. 
 
Upon completion of data collection, the researchers evaluated each of the 
thematic concept lists for similar themes and attempted to further generalize 
3
Wallace and Loffi: Examining UAS Threats & Defenses: A Conceptual Analysis
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015
  
 
   
thematic concepts. For each thematic concept list, the researchers evaluated the 
content area and data to select an appropriate conceptual presentation model.   
 
This research specifically excluded UAS applications by military, state 
entities, recognized governments, or state-sponsored terrorism. Additionally, 
articles dated prior to 2005 were withdrawn from the data to ensure study currency 
and validity.    
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Researchers evaluated 68 academic studies, unclassified government 
reports, and news articles. An analysis of the recurring conceptual themes yielded 
the following results.  
 
Terrorism and Criminal Use of UAS Platforms 
 
As the United States moves closer to fully integrating unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) into the national airspace the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has much work to do in terms of regulations, training, licensing and other 
related issues for a successful integration of the technology for commercial and 
societal benefits. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, among its 
many sections, charged the FAA in Subtitle B, Sections 331 through 336 – 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, to accomplish a safe integration of UAS into domestic 
airspace (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2012). Much controversy over the 
actual implementation and introduction of UAS into the airspace has the FAA 
behind the curve in establishing legal and regulatory guidelines. While UAS 
platforms promise to offer new opportunities, they simultaneously present new 
security threats.  
 
The nefarious aspects of UAS have moved from concept to reality. Before 
UAS have been lawfully vetted and licensed for legitimate uses, certain actors have 
been busying themselves with the criminal aspect and application of UAS. Such 
incidences present a foreshadowing of possible terrorist scenarios that provide 
homeland security officials with a glimpse of terror threats looming on the horizon. 
We must remain vigilant for unexpected methods for the deployment of terror by 
our adversaries. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United 
States (2004) cited four types of failures regarding the protection of the homeland. 
Chief among the failures was imagination. The report went on to say,  
 
America stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and blame. This 
created a kind of cultural asymmetry. To us, Afghanistan seemed very far 
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away. To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they 
were more globalized than we were. (p. 340).  
 
As al Qaeda was more globalized then – terrorists remain shrewd with current 
technology now and UAS is no exception. Some have questioned and even 
criticized officials for considering UAS as a legitimate method for state and non-
state actors to spread terror. In a 2012 article, Wayne Morse, president of American 
Dynamic Flight Systems alluded that for terrorists to consider the use of UAS as a 
means for terror was unlikely and they [terrorists] could simply achieve a better 
result from suicide bombings. The article goes on to call this a myth in the making 
and politicians will use the concept of UAS as a terror weapon as a political tool 
(Gosztola, 2012). Could this be further evidence of a lack of imagination if the illicit 
use of UAS is dismissed as not feasible or practical?   
 
In August 2015 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed law 
enforcement officials in America on notice regarding the use of UAS as a means 
for terror. In their assessment release DHS said, “We cannot rule [out] the ability 
of future adversaries to acquire and use a commercially available [drone] as part of 
an attack within the Homeland" (“DHS,” 2015, para. 5).  
 
 Further evidence exists for the use of UAS as a terror weapon. In October 
2014, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) publicly reported concern 
about an air assault by UAS (“NYPD,” 2014). The technology involved in the 
manufacture of UAS is such that it should be considered as a potential terror threat. 
The NYPD police commissioner cited examples of videos showing UAS accurately 
striking targets with a paintball gun. NYPD is especially concerned about the 
capability of UAS to carry a payload of explosives to a designated target. The 
commissioner cites the video, which disclosed a UAV hovering and landing in front 
of the lectern at a public speaking event conducted by Germany’s Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. Had the UAS been carrying a payload of explosives it would have 
threatened the lives of those in close proximity to the UAS. Such examples reiterate 
the varied potential for illicit UAS use. To defend against UAS threats, one must 
first understand the nature of the threat.   
 
Commercial off the Shelf Threat 
 
 As in most instances of manufacturing, the technology typically outpaces 
regulations and laws. This is especially true with the manufacture and use of UAS. 
The nature of commercial UAS technology makes it exploitable for criminal or 
terroristic purposes directly out of the box, with little modification.  
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Figure 1. Concepts of Illicit UAS Use. 
 
 Nuisance. The most benign illicit use of UAS platforms is the interference 
they create for the general public. Such actions represent any interference with a 
property owner’s rights to use and enjoy their property without substantial or 
unreasonable interference (Soloman, 2014). Similarly, UAS platforms may violate 
an individual’s privacy, sometimes referred to as “intentional intrusion upon 
seclusion,” measured by the standard of whether a normal person would be 
offended by the invasion (Soloman, 2014). The aforementioned behaviors are 
reflected in civil or tort law. A more serious infraction caused by a drone is 
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trespassing, or the illegal intrusion onto someone else’s property (Soloman, 2014). 
Trespassing is encompassed in both criminal and civil law. Nuisance threats go well 
beyond mere irritation. A UAS could potentially upset children or animals on an 
individual’s property.  
 
In a recent wildlife physiology study published in the Journal of Biology, 
researchers found that large predators, when exposed to drones, can incur 
cardiovascular stress (Viegas, 2015). In the study, researchers exposed wild bears 
to short, 5-minute encounters with a flying UAS platform and discovered that the 
animals' heart rates spiked by up to 400% (Viegas, 2015). Furthermore, drones can 
elicit fear or adversely affect an individual’s perceptions of security or safety. In 
May 2015, several residents of Del Mar, California, became concerned about a 
drone that had been spotted numerous times outside the windows of their homes 
(Chambers, 2015). Despite the fact the drone was not equipped with a camera or 
monitoring device, it unnerved local residents, as no one knew who was flying the 
craft and why it was being operated in the middle of the night (Chambers, 2015). 
The operator, who was later identified, claimed “there’s nothing to worry about…I 
just like flying this [drone]” (Chambers, 2015, p. 1).      
 
Monitoring Threat. One of the most notable concerns about UAS 
platforms stems from their potential to silently monitor and record their 
surroundings. Culturally, U.S. citizens tend to be abhorrent to unchecked domestic 
surveillance, legitimate or otherwise. This attitude is readily apparent, evidenced 
by the public outcry and subsequent clamor for reform of the recent National 
Security Agency warrantless wiretapping and similar incidents. One might argue 
that aerial surveillance is not a new threat – anyone with a pilot certificate and 
access to an aircraft has the capability of conducting aerial surveillance.    
 
 Surveillance. UAS platforms, however, change the dynamic of aerial 
surveillance, making it accessible and affordable for almost anyone. With the 
availability of highly automated UAS hobby platforms such as the DJI Phantom, 
one can purchase a relatively sophisticated aerial monitoring platform with high-
resolution capability. Newswire stories of such privacy intrusions by UAS 
platforms are becoming more commonplace. In August 2015, a Hawaii resident 
spotted an unmanned rotorcraft hovering outside her bedroom window, yet law 
enforcement was unable to respond as the action violated no established criminal 
laws (Kawano, 2015). A similar incident occurred in Kentucky, when a concerned 
father disabled a drone caught observing his young daughters in their backyard, yet 
again, police efforts were curtailed since no laws had been broken (Chappell, 2015). 
Perhaps more frightening is the unknown purpose behind many hobby drone 
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flights. While many operators are merely enjoying their UAS devices, others may 
have more sinister observation intentions, such as observing young children.  
 
 Reconnaissance. While similar to surveillance, reconnaissance activities 
take a further step toward illicit behavior. Often confused with surveillance, 
reconnaissance is an activity derived from military terminology that involves 
collecting intelligence on a known "enemy" target. To illustrate, consider the 
example of a criminal seeking to burglarize a house. Surveillance would be the 
actions taken to observe various neighborhood properties; whereas, reconnaissance 
involves scoping out a specific property for exploitable weaknesses, such as 
security, homeowner arrival and departure times, possible entry locations, and other 
related "intelligence" information. Unmanned systems have the capability of 
performing both surveillance and reconnaissance functions. An assessment by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicated drug dealers and drug cartels 
were already beginning to use UAS platforms to monitor police activities along the 
U.S. border (Levine, 2015). Moreover, UAS automation allows operators to 
conduct illicit monitoring activities at a sizable standoff distance, effectively 
preserving their anonymity from potential criminal investigation. Such illicit 
monitoring actions allow criminals or terrorists to assess for vulnerabilities in 
critical infrastructure, government sites, businesses, and private citizens alike. 
 
 Airspace Interference. UAS platforms present a genuine threat to safe 
airspace utilization. The FAA has logged dozens of reports of near-misses between 
airliners and UAS platforms being improperly operated near airports across the 
country. In March 2014, a US Airways regional jet nearly collided with a small 
UAS near Tallahassee, Florida (Whitlock, 2014). September of the same year, 
Republic Airlines reported nearly striking a small unmanned craft at 4,000 feet. 
Also in September 2014, three different airlines inbound to LaGuardia reported 
successive encounters with a UAS operating along the final approach path 
(Whitlock, 2014). In addition to interfering with normal aviation operations, 
unmanned aerial vehicles are impeding emergency response functions. In August 
2015, a SkyLife helicopter came within 20 feet of being struck by a small-
unmanned platform while transporting a patient (Ybarra, 2015). This incident 
comes just one month after California aerial firefighting teams encountered five 
hobbyist-operated UAS craft obscured by smoke near a wildfire operation. Fire 
crews temporarily suspended aerial fire suppression operations for safety while the 
law enforcement personnel attempted to remove the drones from the area 
(Martinez, 2015). An airborne UAS creates a collision threat to aircraft and could 
adversely impact normal and emergency aviation operations. It is conceivable that 
terrorists or criminals could employ UAS craft to disrupt drug interdiction, law 
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enforcement, or medical aircraft with the intended purpose of curtailing tracking, 
emergency response, or disaster mitigation capabilities.  
 
 Kinetic/Kamikaze. Even without armaments, a drone is capable of causing 
damage or injury to people or property on the ground or in the air. While many 
UAS accidents are likely accidental rather than intentional, the risk is the same. In 
March 2015, a small UAS hobby platform crashed into a Miami home, breaking a 
window. Since the drone went unclaimed and police were unable to determine the 
identity of the operator, the property owner had little recourse to recover damages 
(“Mystery,” 2015). In a more serious event in July 2015, a woman was knocked 
unconscious by a falling UAS platform after its owner lost control of the device at 
a Seattle gay pride parade (Rawlinson, 2015). To exemplify the potential kinetic 
lethality of unmanned vehicles, one can simply turn to a gruesome 2003 event in 
which 13-year old Tara Lipscombe was struck in the head by an out of control RC 
aircraft (Allen, 2003). Flying at 50 mph, the 5-foot wide aircraft delivered a lethal 
blow to the young girl, who died merely three hours after the incident (Allen, 2003). 
While the aforementioned incidents appear unintentional, they exemplify the lethal 
potential of UAS systems. Should criminal or terrorist elements wish to carry out 
an attack, an out-of-the-box UAS platform has the potential to deliver a lethal 
kinetic blow to soft targets, while having the potential added benefit of appearing 
as accidental or negligent.   
 
   
Figure 2. Damage caused by small prototype, fixed-wing UAS against a parked static aircraft. 
While this accident was inadvertent, the incurred damage demonstrates the kinetic destructive 
potential of UAS platforms (Used with permission).  
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Payload Threat/Smuggling. UAS platforms can also be exploited as a 
transportation mechanism for illegal contraband or cargo. Use of these platforms 
allow terrorists or criminals to bypass traditional security barriers such as fences, 
walls, and detection measures. Essentially, drones add a skyward dimension to 
security considerations. The New York Times reported an incident occurring in 
Bishopville, South Carolina at the Lee Correctional Institution where a UAS was 
spotted by prison officials flying from a wooded area near the prison toward the 
perimeter of the institution (Schmidt, 2015). A guard reported seeing a man running 
away from the wooded area. Later prison officials found a package left by the UAS, 
which contained a cellphone, tobacco, and marijuana. The package had become 
tangled in the power lines near the prison and the crashed remains of a UAS were 
located nearby. The director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections stated 
it appeared to be a delivery system (Schmidt, 2015). A similar incident occurred in 
Tijuana in April 2015. A hexicopter carrying 7 pounds of methamphetamines 
operating just two miles from the U.S.-Mexico border crashed into a shopping 
center parking lot (Davis, 2015). The incident marks a novel approach to drug 
smuggling that law enforcement officials call an emerging threat (Davis, 2015).   
 
 Weaponized Threat. Perhaps the most fearsome threat produced by 
terrorist or criminal entities involve the deliberate construction or modification of 
UAS systems to carry and employ weapons. This application of UAS platforms has 
received the bulwark of speculation and even fear mongering among industry 
experts, but is well-justified considering the relative ease in which a UAS platform 
can be weaponized to produce devastating results. Wilkinson (2012) explains, 
"Terrorists have demonstrated repeatedly that their goals and objectives can be 
accomplished by using the same tactics and 'off-the-shelf' weapons (though 
cleverly modified or adapted to their needs) that they have traditionally relied upon” 
(p. 23).  Armaments that can be added to UAS platforms vary widely from jury-
rigged incendiary or explosive devices to carefully engineered projectile systems.  
 
 Non-Lethal Systems. While the use of non-lethal systems are not generally 
associated with criminal activity, the production of such systems is already 
underway for law enforcement and security purposes. Mounting a drone with 
systems capable of firing rubber bullets, tear gas, or taser nodes has several 
promising applications for law enforcement organizations (Kersey, 2012). In 
March 2014, the technology company Chaotic Moon successfully armed a UAS 
with an 80,000-volt Taser and test fired the weapon on a volunteer from the 
company. Called the Chaotic Unmanned Personal Intercept Drone (CUPID), the 
experimental device was controlled by a smart phone, with further automated 
features currently under development (Metro, 2014). It is not unreasonable to 
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speculate that terrorist or criminal elements could foreseeably gain access to such 
systems through either proliferation or theft.     
 
 Projectile Threats. While the prospect of UAS platforms carrying firearms 
or other lethal projectile weapons might seem particularly troubling, the likelihood 
of such a modification is reasonably low compared to other weaponization efforts. 
The development of an effective projectile weapon system such as a gun or missile 
requires highly specialized engineering and fabrication expertise. Without 
engineering expertise, access to these types of UAS systems is generally limited to 
a select group of special operations or military organizations. Moreover, such 
technology generally remains tightly guarded against physical theft or proliferation, 
making the acquisition of such systems by terrorists or criminal elements extremely 
improbable. Despite the aforementioned complications, some individuals have self-
produced UAS projectile systems that show alarming ingenuity. In June 2015 an 
18-year old mechanical engineering student equipped his UAS with a semi-
automatic pistol and successfully fired the weapon while his UAS was airborne 
(Kerley, 2015). Local and federal authorities were investigating the incident to 
determine if any criminal statutes had been violated.  
 
 IED/Explosive. The use of drones as a delivery system for improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), incendiary devices, or other combustibles remains high. 
Terrorists in particular have shown great ingenuity in crafting rudimentary 
explosives. According to Wilkinson (2012), "Relying on unconventional 
adaptations or modifications to conventional explosive devices, these [terrorist] 
organizations have been able to develop innovative and devastatingly effective 
means to conceal, deliver, and detonate all kinds of bombs" (p. 19). Dolnik (2007) 
further explains that some terrorist groups are already considering the benefits of a 
UAS delivery system, "Terrorists in Kashmir have experimented with remote-
control model planes and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to deliver explosives 
from the air" (p. 45). The 2011 plot by Rezwan Ferdaus to use remote control 
aircraft to deliver and detonate explosives against the U.S. Capital building and 
Pentagon show that terrorists already consider UAS platforms as a viable method 
of weapon delivery ("Model," 2011).   
 
 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Weapons of mass destruction 
represent particularly lethal threats stemming from the use of hazardous materials 
including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) substances. 
Use of UAS platforms as a delivery system for CBRN substances are particularly 
troublesome, as such delivery systems could easily bypass traditional security 
measures. Moreover, such systems can effectively cause mass casualties without 
the need for precision flying. A drone could merely over-fly the target area where 
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a CBRN substance could be deployed in aerosol form or a dispensing mechanism 
dropped from the craft. One such plot by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization was 
foiled in 2013 by Iraqi military intelligence personnel ("Iraq," 2013). The 
organization planned to employ remote control aircraft to release chemicals 
including sarin gas, mustard gas, and chlorine bombs ("Iraq," 2013). According to 
U.S. officials, these substances were selected to enhance the lethality of the planned 
attack ("Iraq," 2013).  
 
Conversely, some experts argue that CBRN substances are less likely to be 
used by terrorist organizations. Davis et al. (2014) notes that WMD substances are 
less than ideal for terrorist use, as they are difficult to weaponize and generally 
produce fewer casualties than traditional explosives. Davis et al. (2014) further 
explains that radiological or nuclear substances in particular pose as much threat to 
terrorists as the general public and that the prolonged exposure required to 
weaponize a radiological threat would likely be fatal to the instigator. Nevertheless, 
the 2015 incident in which a drone landed on the roof of the Japanese Prime 
Minister's office emphasizes the reality of such threats. The canister carried by the 
drone was believed to contain a radioactive Cesium compound ("Drone laced," 
2015).        
 
 Electronic Attack. A particularly novel threat presented by drones is the 
potential to use them as platforms to commit an electronic attack or electronic theft. 
The SensePost "Snoopy" UAV can be equipped to digitally hijack a smart phone's 
wireless signal and gain access to personal information contained on the device 
(Gittleson, 2014). Snoopy developer Glenn Wilkerson alludes that any Wi-Fi-
enabled device is vulnerable to the Snoopy system. He further describes how the 
Snoopy system can impersonate a Wi-Fi trusted network and even exploit the 
phone's unique MAC address to track its location (Gittleson, 2014). Wilkerson goes 
on to explain that the mobility of the device allows it to bypass traditional security 
measures and simultaneously maintain stealth (Gittleson, 2014). The device bears 
a striking similarity to the Stingray phone tracking system, with substantially 
enhanced capabilities. It is conceivable that such technology would be highly 
sought-after by intelligence agencies and law enforcement entities and could be 
easily adapted by unscrupulous elements to be used for identity theft, blackmail, 
corporate espionage, or any number of other illicit activities.     
 
UAS Defense Concepts 
 
Analysis of the data revealed 39 unique UAS defense concepts, however, 
articles only offered a limited array of pragmatic defense options. In no instance 
was a grand strategy or cumulative protection model presented to cope with UAS 
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threats. Defense concepts were assessed and organized into a cumulative defense-
in-depth model. Viega and McGraw (2002) (as cited in Barnum, Gegick, & 
Michael, 2005) assert, “The idea behind defense in depth is to manage risk with 
diverse defensive strategies so that if one layer of defense turns out to be 
inadequate, another layer of defense will hopefully prevent a full breach” (p. 1). 
Schneier (2000) (as cited in Barnum et al., 2005) also supports this notion, stating, 
“Don’t rely on single solutions. Use multiple complementary security products so 
that a failure in one does not mean total insecurity” (p. 1). This concept is used as 
a staple throughout security industry to protect people and assets.   
 
Organization of the data into a defense in depth model for UAS threats 
yielded a five-layer, concentric circle of defense which included the following 
broad defense strategies: Prevention, Deterrence, Denial, and Detection. The fifth 
and final layer of defense was split into diverging subcategories of Interruption and 
Destruction.  
 
 
Figure 3. UAS Defense in Depth Model. 
 
Prevention. Perhaps the most important layer of UAS defense lies in 
preventing a UAS attack. The bulwark of preventing UAS threats is credited to the 
intelligence community. Preemptive law enforcement investigation and 
intelligence collection efforts have often been the singular mechanism that 
interrupts dangerous terrorist and criminal plots. According to Lele and Mishra 
(2009),  
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Existing air defense systems are ineffective against terrorist mini-
UAVs…this is where the challenge exists for the state. The main effort of 
dealing with the threat of terrorist UAVs needs to be on preventative 
measures. Under such circumstances, the role of actionable intelligence 
[emphasis added] becomes very important. (p. 61). 
 
The unraveling of the 2011 Rezwan Ferdaus plot to fly three remotely-controlled 
aircraft into the Pentagon and Capital buildings exemplifies the importance of 
intelligence intervention. After being tipped off by a cooperative witness, 
undercover FBI agents used traditional surveillance, undercover operations, and 
other intelligence and investigative methods to discover and thwart Ferdaus’ 
planned drone attack (“Affidavit,” 2011; Kimery, 2015). 
 
 Supplementing intelligence and preemptive investigative activities, is the 
establishment of critical component purchase monitoring. Jackson, Frelinger, 
Lostumbo and Button (2008) suggest the establishment of purchase monitoring and 
reporting programs for distributors of UAS components or related technologies to 
report suspicious customer behavior or questionable purchase patterns (Jackson et 
al., 2008). The authors also call for enhanced counter-proliferation programs to 
curtail adversary access to heavy payload or long-range UAS platforms (Jackson et 
al., 2008). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) echoed the call for 
further proliferation controls, citing an increased U.S. vulnerability to terrorist 
intelligence gathering or attacks if adversary organizations acquire unmanned 
systems (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012).   
 
Deterrence. The second layer of UAS threat defense lies in the deterrence 
of UAS attacks. Data overwhelmingly indicated the need for enhanced legislation 
to curtail illegal or terroristic UAS activities. The legislative remedy to counter 
UAS threats comes in two basic mechanisms. The first mechanism relies on 
legislation to create, establish, and most-importantly, fund various formal UAS 
defense measures by equipping agencies to develop and deploy a concerted UAS 
defense. The second category of legislative remedy lies in the establishment of civil 
and criminal penalties to deter illegal UAS use. Wright (2010) suggests that the 
deterrent effect of legal punishments is based on two distinct factors: the certainty 
of punishment and the severity of punishment. According to Wright, if people were 
certain they would be apprehended for committing a crime, most would likely not 
do so (Wright, 2010). Unfortunately, the deterrent effect is almost negated if the 
risk of getting arrested, convicted, and punished is negligible (Wright, 2010). 
Severity of punishment also plays a role in deterrence, if the offending subject is 
aware of the rules and consequences and subsequently makes a rational cost-benefit 
analysis of committing the offense (Wright, 2010).  
14
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 1
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1084
  
 
   
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has done little to capitalize on 
the deterrent effect of either principle. In fact, even established corporations are 
breaking the rules. Peter Sosnowski, a preconstruction director for Webcor Builders 
comments about his company’s overt, illegal commercial use of drones stating: 
“Officially [the FAA’s] stance is, You can’t do that [fly drones for commercial 
use]…until someone gets caught and penalized, drone businesses will continue to 
do business as is” (Nicas, 2015, p. 1). The FAA’s use of Cease and Desist letters 
and civil penalties are proving relatively ineffective in deterring illegal drone use. 
If the FAA cannot keep seemingly law-abiding businesses in line, it is unlikely 
established penalties will have any hope of deterring a committed criminal or 
terrorist.   
 
 In addition to legislative deterrence, several articles suggested the 
implementation of No Fly Zones as an additional deterrent against illegal use of 
UAS platforms in sensitive areas. In many ways, no fly zones are equally as 
ineffective as legal deterrent measures, with the exception that such areas are 
usually manned with other physical or active security measures. While deterrence 
plays a role in UAS defense, the effectiveness of this security layer relies on the 
compliance of UAS operators. In the event of terrorism or criminal activity, 
deterrent measures should be considered relatively ineffective. 
 
  Denial. The third layer of UAS threat defense encompasses all passive 
security measures to thwart the use or effectiveness of drones in conducting illegal 
activities or terrorism. Passive security measures provide an ideal security 
mechanism for averting UAS threats, since many such measures are inexpensive 
and relatively easy to implement with advanced planning. Perhaps the most 
important denial measure is the protected asset’s physical environment. Selection 
of a location that presents hazards or impediments to UAS operations can 
dramatically enhance security against UAS threats. Large trees or high structures 
can make controlling or maneuvering a UAS difficult. Moreover, the presence of 
such obstacles can also make the likely vector of inbound UAS threats more 
predictable. In many cases, obstacles can limit the type of UAS platforms that can 
be employed; confined spaces surrounded by tall obstacles for example denies the 
ease of approach and maneuverability for fixed wing platforms.  
 
In the event obstacles are not available in the venue area, man-made 
obstacles such as nets can be deployed to thwart UAS operations (Chuter, 2015). 
The selection of an indoor venue provides further security from UAS threats, as it 
provides a physical barrier and obfuscates the exact location of the target from an 
external UAS attack. Even adverse weather can provide mitigation from a UAS 
attack, as high winds, limited visibility, precipitation, and other atmospheric factors 
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can adversely affect UAS controllability or performance, particularly for small 
platforms.  
 
 A critical sub-component of denial lies in the use of unpredictability, often 
called random security measures. Terrorists usually prepare attacks according to a 
carefully executed planning cycle that includes: broad target selection, intelligence 
gathering and surveillance, specific target selection, pre-attack surveillance and 
planning, rehearsals, actions on the objective [attack], and culminates with escape 
and exploitation (U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command, 2003). Ensuring 
unpredictability in security through the use of random security measures interrupts 
the terrorism planning cycle by denying the adversary critical intelligence and 
surveillance information. According to Card (2014), unpredictable security 
measures such as varying transport routes and schedules “make it harder for all 
terrorists to target high-risk personnel, not just against possible UAV attacks, and 
it is recommended these measures continue to be used” (Card, 2014, p. 26). The 
importance of unpredictability and random security measures cannot be understated 
when defending against UAS threats. 
 
  Another proposed mechanism of UAS threat denial is the encoding of UAS 
navigation software to prevent UAS use in certain designated areas. Called “geo-
fencing,” this approach is coded in the hardware by the UAS manufacturers to 
prevent the craft from operating within the confines of pre-established virtual 
boundaries. Drone producer DJI currently uses geo-fencing to prevent its drones 
from operating in the Washington D.C. area and around airports (Gettinger, 2015).   
 
 Detection. In the event passive defense mechanisms fail to prevent, deter, 
or deny a UAS threat, active defense mechanisms must be employed. The 
employment of weapons or other active defense means requires rapid detection or 
early warning of the UAS, identification of the threat, and subsequent telemetry 
tracking to perform an engagement. Several varieties of emerging technologies 
have been developed to fulfill this security requirement.  
 
Active detection. Active detection mechanisms involve the use of radar 
signals produced by a transmitting device to reflect off a UAS and be detected by 
the radar receiver. Conventional radar has significant difficulty detecting and 
tracking small UAS craft. First, small UAS craft have very small cross-sections—
the surface area that reflects radar signals. This small surface area results in a 
smaller reflectivity of the radar signal, which reduces the probability that the radar 
return signal strength will exceed the radar’s detection threshold. Secondly, most 
radar systems are equipped with computer or operator-assigned detection 
thresholds that further filter out spurious radar returns such as wildlife, 
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precipitation, or other non-relevant information. Without such radar filtering 
systems, operators would have difficulty determining the difference between an 
aerial contact and clutter. Despite these operational challenges, some radar experts 
have achieved success in overcoming UAS detection difficulties. Thales Nederland 
has configured its Squire multipurpose radar system to detect UAS systems 
(Chuter, 2015). In Chuter (2015), Thales sensor development expert Wilm Shuttert 
highlighted the capabilities of the new system,  
 
Detection is not the issue. Everybody can detect an object. The big trick is 
discriminating small UAVs from birds. We have invested a lot in 
developing the algorithms to detect and discriminate a UAV from birds 
smaller than a blackbird (p. 1).  
 
Thales’ success reveals that with modification, radar systems can be configured to 
detect and track UAS systems. Further study of radar modifications is 
recommended to determine their false alarm rate to wildlife.   
 
 Passive detection. Passive detection systems use sensors that sample the 
electromagnetic spectrum within certain wavelengths to determine the presence of 
UAS-characteristic signals. Passive UAS detection systems currently include 
visual, acoustic, thermal/infrared, and UAS communications/control frequencies 
(Beaudoin, Gademer, Avanthey, Germain, & Vittori, 2015).   
 
 Visual detection of UAS platforms is perhaps the simplest method of 
detection. Several factors can affect the visual detection of UAS platforms 
including: distance of the UAS, the ambient illumination of the UAS, atmospheric 
clarity, color and contrast of the UAS, position of the UAS within the field of view, 
focus of the eye, and visual fatigue (“Aviation,” n.d.). Visual detection is further 
complicated by individual physiological limitations or visual degradation caused 
by drugs, alcohol or other vision-degrading substances (“Aviation,” n.d.). Finally, 
visual detection can also be adversely affected by a number of visual illusions 
(“Aviation,” n.d.).  
 
UAS platforms can also be detected by evaluating ambient sound for 
characteristic engine noises.  This technology generally focuses on detecting the 
acoustic wave frequencies formed by commonly-used UAS engines (Quantum 
Technology Sciences, 2015).  Quantum Technology acoustic detection systems use 
advanced acoustic processing, allowing an operator to determine both the bearing 
and the type of UAS threat, based on its unique signature (Quantum Technology 
Sciences, 2015). Quantum Technology Sciences (2015) report the ability to 
acoustically detect and track a UAS platform at up to 350 meters. A competing 
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company, Drone Labs, claims their systems can detect a drone up to 100 feet away 
in normal environments, and up to 300 feet away in quiet conditions (“It’s a bird,” 
2015). While these systems show great promise, their application is likely to be 
limited based on the ambient noises of the environment and may not be appropriate 
for all security situations.  
 
Thermal or infrared detection systems make use of the infrared radiation 
spectrum, which utilizes slightly longer wavelengths then visible light. While both 
systems use the infrared spectrum, what they detect is quite different. The near 
wavelength infrared spectrum lies just beyond the visual EM spectrum, functions 
characteristically similar to visible light, and is what some people would call night 
vision (B. Lincoln, 2013). These systems are ideal for detecting UAS platforms in 
low-light conditions. Conversely, long wavelength infrared utilizes lower infrared 
frequencies that can differentiate thermal variances and is more commonly known 
as thermal imaging (Light, n.d.). These systems detect the difference between the 
ambient environmental temperature and the heat-producing parts of an unmanned 
system, such as the engines (“UAVs,” 2015). Thermal infrared systems benefit 
from high sensor contrast between a heat-producing target and relatively 
homogeneous background (Koretsky, Nicoll, & Taylor, 2013).  
 
The final method of passive detection of UAS craft involves the monitoring 
of the EM spectrum typically associated with UAS control or communications 
(Beaudoin et al, 2015). This form of signal detection provides an alert to UAS 
control signal presence after which triangulation can be used to obtain signal 
bearing information. Signal identification can be derived from comparing received 
signals to a database of known UAS platform control signals that takes into account 
signal frequency, modulation, and other factors to uniquely identify an electronic 
fingerprint for the signal source—in this case, a UAS transmitter. This method of 
UAS detection should be employed in concert with complementary active defenses 
such as control interruption, spoofing, or jamming.  
 
Rapid detection, identification, and tracking of UAS threats are critical to 
establishing an effective threat response. Timely detection will allow maximum 
opportunity to employ active defense measures against a threat UAS, permit rapid 
evacuation, and execute pre-established emergency response plans.   
 
Active defenses. Active defenses represent the final, layer of security 
against UAS threats. It is important to note that not all UAS threats require an active 
response. A risk management evaluation should be performed to assess the 
potential UAS threat’s capabilities, available response time, mitigation alternatives, 
and the potential for collateral damage caused by implementing an active defense 
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measure. Active UAS defense measures come in two basic varieties: UAS 
interruption or UAS destruction. 
 
Interruption. Interruption defenses are active measures designed to avert a 
threat UAS from carrying out an adverse action. Interruption can be carried out in 
one of three ways: operator interruption, jamming, and spoofing. The most obvious 
method of UAS interruption is to locate and identify the UAS operator and either 
forcibly compel the operator’s compliance in removing the UAS threat or assuming 
direct control of the UAS. Park rangers in Hawaii recently confronted a tourist 
illegally operating a UAS near the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park caldera where 
a large crowd had gathered (M. Lincoln, 2015). When confronted by the ranger, the 
operator refused to provide identification and attempted to flee the scene, resulting 
in the suspect being “tasered” by the ranger and subsequently arrested (M. Lincoln, 
2015). This method of UAS interruption is highly unpredictable due to a number 
of factors.  
 
First, the operator may be uncooperative in complying with security 
instructions in removing the UAS threat, such as a terroristic or criminal use of a 
UAS. Secondly, detaining the operator may not prevent the threat UAS from 
completing its assigned activity, as certain automated UAS systems can be 
programmed to perform functions with little operator input. In the event the UAS 
operators is uncooperative in redirecting, landing or removing the UAS threat, 
security personnel may be required to take direct control of the UAS to avoid a 
disaster. The lack of UAS control standardization, required specialized flying 
experience, and other unpredictable complicating factors may make assuming 
direct control of the threat UAS just as dangerous as allowing the operator to 
continue the adverse action. It is difficult to provide recommendations in such a 
circumstance, as an appropriate response would be dictated based on a multitude of 
situational factors. 
 
The second method of interrupting a threat UAS platform involves jamming 
its control or navigation system. Jamming is the electronic bombardment of 
frequency interference designed to drown out the UAS control system from 
receiving transmitted control instructions or navigation information. With many 
UAS platforms reliant on external navigation inputs from Global Positioning 
System (GPS) satellites, jamming these frequencies may prevent the threat UAS 
from precisely carrying out its operator-assigned task. This response method 
presents its own unique risks and requires knowledge of the UAS type and specific 
system capabilities to determine effectiveness. Some UAS platforms have inertial 
navigation systems that supplement GPS navigation; these UAS systems would be 
relatively unaffected and incur only degraded precision navigation performance. 
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Other systems will merely perform a static hover until navigation connectivity is 
restored or until the UAS power is depleted. Perhaps more importantly, the 
jamming of navigation signals, particularly GPS, can adversely affect other 
legitimate GPS systems within the jamming transmitter’s field of influence. 
Succinctly, jamming operators must be cautious against inadvertently causing 
collateral interference by interrupting other GPS-reliant systems in its proximity.   
  
The jamming operator must also understand how the threat UAS will 
respond to control frequency jamming. Some UAS aircraft will automatically 
return to the launch point if the UAS loses control connectivity, whereas others will 
carry out the last operator instructions. UAS response to jamming is highly variable 
based on the UAS manufacturer and designed system capabilities. 
 
The final method of UAS interruption is a form of deceptive jamming 
known as spoofing. Defensive spoofing involves an operator sending falsified 
navigation or control data to a threat UAS that mimics legitimate data. Spoofing 
systems can divert a UAS threat away from the target area by feeding it false 
coordinates or control instructions (Gettinger, 2015). Unencrypted control or 
navigation systems are vulnerable to spoofing, since the UAS system has no way 
to differentiate between authentic control signals verses the “spoofed” signals. 
 
While system interruption provides an active defense against UAS threats, 
these defense mechanisms are wrought with unknown risks. Jamming defense 
measures should not be employed without a clear identification of the UAS 
platform and a knowledge of expected system responses to lost navigation or 
control links.        
 
Destruction. Destructive defense measures are employed with the sole 
purpose of eradicating a threat UAS platform. This defense mechanism can be 
implemented using a wide variety of means including projectile weapons, directed 
energy weapons, guided munitions, and interception. Destructive weapons should 
be used as a last resort, as the airborne destruction of a UAS threat can potentially 
cause collateral damage. In the event a threat UAS platform is damaged or 
destroyed, collateral damage can be incurred by falling debris, falling weapon 
projectiles, field of fire obstructions, scattered NBC elements (if equipped) and 
other related factors. Gallagher (2013) agrees, citing, “Just shooting drones in a 
crowded environment could cause more damage than the drones themselves” (p. 
1).  
 
Projectile weapons are perhaps the most obvious form of destructive 
defense. Firearms can certainly damage or destroy a small UAS platform. Turkish 
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police used firearms to destroy a small quadcopter overviewing protests in Istanbul 
in 2013; and, in a posted video, the drone can be seen being struck by bullet and 
falling to the ground (Estes, 2013). It is notable that during this shooting, the UAS 
could be seen operating at low altitude. Furthermore, the video revealed tall 
obstacles and buildings present in near proximity to the UAS, however, it is 
unknown if the engagement caused any collateral damage.   
 
In September 2014, a New Jersey man discharged a shotgun at an airborne 
drone, which caused the operator to lose control (Back, 2014). A similar incident 
occurred in Kentucky in July 2015, in which a homeowner used a shotgun to down 
a drone flying at 250’ over his home (Chappell, 2015). In Gallagher (2015) Klaas 
Jan de Kraker and Rob van de Wiel suggest, “Rapid fire guns with suitable 
ammunition and machine guns are considered as very effective means for 
neutralizing mini UAVs,” but add “hard kill systems could generate collateral 
damage.” (p. 1). A possible projectile variant in lieu of firearms is the use of anti-
helicopter weapons that spread shrapnel or pointed projectiles such as flechettes 
(Chuter, 2015).  
 
Projectile weapons can increase lethality against small UAS systems when 
a guidance system is added. So-called smart weapons allow for tracking systems to 
provide updated telemetry, course correction, and detonation commands to the 
projectile warhead (Prigg, 2015). The U.S. Army is currently testing a new system 
dubbed the Extended Area Protection and Survivability Integrated Demonstration, 
where a truck-mounted 50mm cannon fires a smart projectile carrying a directional 
fragmentary-explosive (Prigg, 2015). The projectile would receive in-flight course 
updates and detonation commands from mobile fire control computer (Prigg, 2015). 
While guided surface-to-air weapons such as Patriot missiles, MANPADS, other 
similar systems can theoretically be used against UAS systems, such systems are 
largely impractical in urban environments (Gettinger, 2015).       
 
De Kraker and van de Weil advocate directed energy weapons such as lasers 
or microwave systems to destroy UAS threats, citing such systems yield a lower 
risk to people and property than projectile weapons (Gallagher, 2013). Some 
experts disagree, however, Chuter (2015) states, “Lasers are an expensive way of 
solving the problem…part of the problem is that blowing up, or in the case of a 
laser, burning, even a small UAV in urban areas or over critical infrastructure may 
be unacceptable” (p. 1). According to Popular Mechanics (2009), lasers have 
limited application against UAS threats, because lasers are susceptible to 
atmospheric refraction, cloud cover, and must maintain contact with the platform 
to overheat the targeted flight component. While this developmental technology 
21
Wallace and Loffi: Examining UAS Threats & Defenses: A Conceptual Analysis
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015
  
 
   
minimizes the collateral damage caused by an errant projectile weapon, it fails to 
eliminate the hazards caused by falling debris.   
 
The final proposal in UAS threat destruction lies in the employment of 
unmanned counter-UAS platforms. This methodology of UAS defense is still 
largely speculative (Gettinger, 2015). Some suggested implementations of this 
approach involve defending UAS platforms capturing threat UAS craft with nets or 
other impediments (Gettinger, 2015). While this suggested defense is intriguing, 
the development necessary to make it a reliable and pragmatic defense measure 
make this little more than a hypothetical possibility at this point.  
 
Conclusions 
 
UAS Threats 
 
 UAS platforms can be used by terrorist or criminal elements for several 
purposes. In their unmodified state, UAS platforms can create a public nuisance, 
interfere with aircraft or airspace operations, collect information that can be utilized 
for illicit purposes, and be employed as a kinetic weapons. As a transportation 
device, a UAS device can be used to smuggle illegal substances into forbidden areas 
by bypassing traditional security measures. Finally, UAS platforms can be 
weaponized with non-lethal, projectile, improvised explosives, weapons of mass 
destruction, or even commit digital attacks.    
 
UAS technology represents a new tool that can be used for either good or 
ill. While it is likely that most UAS platforms will be employed for legitimate and 
productive purposes, one cannot ignore the potential for illicit exploitation of such 
capabilities. The wide availability and low cost of UAS platforms make them an 
attractive purchase for terrorists or criminals to add aerial capability to illicit 
activities. Moreover, the use of unmanned systems adds a new layer of 
complication in the investigative process, as automation and increased standoff 
distances provide perpetrators a shield of anonymity. In the event of a plot failure, 
this anonymity reduces the risk of capture, leaving terrorists or criminals "free to 
strike another day."  
 
 The threat is real.  Terrorists are adept at using new technology to their 
advantage and purpose. UAS have been modified to carry explosives, automatic 
weapons, and non-lethal weapons. Criminals have used UAS to further their 
enterprises. The threat is not exaggerated or hyped. Homeland security and law 
enforcement officials have taken notice of the real threats posed by UAS platforms. 
The potential malicious uses of UAS platforms are limited only by the imagination 
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of the user. The many documented incidents of terrorist and criminal uses of UAS 
both domestically and abroad should be a red flag to officials to act and employ 
mitigation strategies against this evolving threat.   
 
Evaluation of UAS Defenses 
 
 An evaluation of the collected data suggest several methods of defending 
against UAS threats. Measures such as export controls, critical component 
monitoring, and intelligence collection efforts can preempt a UAS threat before it 
can be employed. Similarly, deterrent efforts such as criminal penalties, civil torts, 
law enforcement presence, or established no-fly zones can potentially dissuade 
perpetrators from illicitly using UAS platforms. The use of random security 
measures and careful selection of locations that includes natural or man-made 
obstructions, can effectively deny UAS threat operations. The inclusion of geo-
fencing protections in commercially-sold UAS platforms can also deny UAS 
platforms from performing illicit operations in certain geographical areas. If 
unimpeded by previous defense measures, rapid detection, identification and 
tracking of the UAS threat is required to effectively employ active, counter-UAS 
defenses. With modification, active sensor systems have shown promise in 
detecting UAS threats. With additional development and testing, it is highly likely 
that passive sensors will also become viable detectors for UAS threats. The final 
defense against UAS threats include interruption or destruction of the UAS craft. 
Interruption activities such as jamming, spoofing, or operator intervention are 
possible, but increase the risk of creating unintentional or unanticipated side effects. 
Alternatively, UAS threat destruction methods appear to be effective, however, are 
likely to cause collateral damage, particularly in urban environments.  
 
While it may be tempting to focus UAS defense efforts on the establishment 
of new interruption or destructive systems, the most efficient and cost-effective 
means of defense lie in prevention, deterrence, and denial. While entrepreneurial 
efforts are currently underway to develop new technologies to detect, interrupt, or 
destroy UAS platforms, the industry should not be so quick to dismiss existing 
resources. A repurposing of existing technology such as radar and select passive 
detection technology shows great promise in addressing the challenges of UAS 
detection, identification, and tracking.  
 
Similarly, a shotgun seems equally up to the task of engaging certain threat 
UAS platforms as more expensive developmental weapon systems. The selection 
and employment of defensive systems should be based on the threat UAS 
capabilities, coupled with an evaluation of the risk, including risks to non-
participating groups. While the myriad of traditional and novel UAS defenses have 
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demonstrated the ability to negate an airborne UAS threat, aerial engagement may 
not always be the most appropriate response. While the initial temptation may be 
to immediately destroy a potential UAS threat, careful consideration must be given 
to the potential for collateral damage caused both by the engaging weapon system 
and falling UAS debris. In such cases, the consequences of an in appropriate 
defensive response could create a more severe catastrophe than the offending UAS 
platform. 
 
Perhaps the greatest security lesson learned is that UAS technologies must 
be included in the security assessments. The true threat lies not in what is known 
about malicious UAS uses, but rather in what is unknown. UAS platforms represent 
a novel and largely unpredictable threat with many potential asymmetric terroristic 
and criminal applications. In the same manner that the 9/11 changed attitudes about 
the potential threats of civil aviation, the misuse of unmanned systems has the 
potential to cause similar catastrophic results. Until now, the security community 
has been fortunate that recent newsworthy events caused by UAS platforms at the 
Merkel campaign fundraiser, White House, and Japanese Prime Minister’s office 
have all had relatively benign impact. Such situations must serve as a clear wakeup 
call for the industry to acknowledge the security risks presented by UAS technology 
and prepare defenses against illicit UAS applications. Security personnel must now 
remain vigilant to the skies and keep UAS threats in their cross-check.  
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